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MINISTERIAL MAGIC: TAX-FREE HOUSING AND RELIGIOUS 
EMPLOYERS  
 
Bridget J. Crawford and Emily Gold Waldman* 
ABSTRACT 
Religious organizations enjoy many of the same benefits that other non-profit organizations do. Churches, temples 
and mosques, for example, generally are exempt from local real estate taxes. Economically speaking, a tax exemp-
tion has the same effect as a subsidy; freedom from tax liability means that the organization can devote its financial 
resources to other activities. But where an exemption afforded to a religious employee is broader than the equivalent 
exemption available to a secular employee, a significant Establishment Clause concern is raised.  The parsonage 
exemption of Internal Revenue Code Section 107 presents such an issue: ministers are permitted to exclude cash 
housing allowances from their taxable income as a matter of course, even though the equivalent exemptions for 
secular employees are far more limited.  Recently, however, in Gaylor v. Mnuchin, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that the parsonage exemption violates the Establishment 
Clause.  This Essay evaluates the court’s reasoning and suggests that the decision minimized the extent to which 
the parsonage exemption provides active governmental support for religion. This minimization, we argue, led to a 
distorted Establishment Clause analysis and the wrong result.  We also address an issue lurking in the background: 
the intersection between the parsonage exemption and sex discrimination, given that some religions do not permit 
women to serve in religious leadership roles that would qualify them as ministers under Section 107. Although the 
stronger constitutional argument against the parsonage exemption stems from the Establishment Clause, both issues 
raise important policy concerns.  
INTRODUCTION 
The “parsonage exemption” is a little-known—but substantial—tax ben-
efit for religious entities in the United States.  The exemption, contained in 
Internal Revenue Code Section 107, allows “ministers of the gospel” to ex-
clude the value of their housing benefits from their taxable income, even 
when those benefits take the form of a housing allowance rather than physical 
housing.1 A Treasury Department report estimates that, in the aggregate, the 
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 1 26 U.S.C.A. § 107(2) [hereinafter “I.R.C.”].  
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benefit is worth more than $800 million in foregone taxes each year.2 The 
vast majority of that amount is attributable to non-taxable cash allowances 
for ministers, rabbis, imams, and other religious leaders; one recent analysis 
indicates that 87% of such leaders receive a housing allowance, while only 
11% receive in-kind housing (such as use of a parsonage itself).3 
The tax laws are, of course, full of rules, exceptions, and exemptions that 
bestow tax-advantaged (or tax-disadvantaged) status.  Because of the parson-
age exemption’s explicit and material advantaging of religion, however, it 
raises significant Establishment Clause questions.  In March 2019, the Sev-
enth Circuit ruled—in a case closely watched by religious organizations 
throughout the country—that the parsonage exemption did not violate the 
Establishment Clause, reversing the district court’s ruling that it did. In this 
Essay, we explore the troubling implications of the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
Gaylor v. Mnuchin.4 The decision may well be analyzed further by an en banc 
panel and/or the Supreme Court.  
In Part I, we provide an overview of the parsonage exemption and of the 
test case recently brought by the Freedom From Religion Foundation 
(“FFRF”) to challenge the law’s constitutionality.  Part II evaluates the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Seventh Circuit’s Establishment Clause anal-
ysis in the case.  We argue that the Seventh Circuit understated the extent to 
which the parsonage exemption provides active governmental support for 
religion, while overstating the religious entanglement that would result if the 
exemption were narrowed to cover only in-kind housing (as opposed to cash 
allowances).  We also question the Seventh Circuit’s broad conclusion that 
the parsonage exemption passes the “historical significance” standard laid 
out by the Supreme Court in Town of Greece v. Galloway,5 notwithstanding the 
significant differences between the practice being challenged in Town of Greece 
(legislative prayer at the beginning of town board meetings) and the parson-
age exemption, which is a financial benefit of much more recent vintage. 
Part III of the Essay turns to a new issue: how the parsonage exemption 
intersects with sex discrimination concerns, given that some religions do not 
permit women to serve in religious leadership roles that would qualify them 
as ministers for purposes of Section 107.6  The Supreme Court already has 
 
 2 See Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Expenditures: Fiscal Year 2020, at 24 
(Oct. 19, 2018). 
 3 See Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra, Are Pastors’ Homes That Different?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (June 24, 2014), 
https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2014/june/are-pastors-homes-that-different.html (report-
ing that 87% of pastors receive cash housing allowance and 11% receive in-kind allowances). 
 4 Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2019), available at https://tinyurl.com/y256qfo3.  
 5 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
 6 See, e.g., David Masci, The Divide Over Ordaining Women, Pew Res. Ctr. FactTank (Sept 9, 2014) (listing 
multiple denominations that do not ordain women). 
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made clear that the “ministerial exception” allows religions to enforce such 
sex classifications without risking employment discrimination liability.7 The 
parsonage exemption, in turn, can amplify the effect of that sex discrimina-
tion by depriving women of the corresponding tax benefits as well.  Moreo-
ver, the broad definition of who counts as a “minister” for purposes of the 
ministerial exception in the antidiscrimination context means that a woman 
working for a religious entity could find herself in the worst of both worlds: 
enough of a “minister” that the ministerial exception bars her from bringing 
any employment discrimination claim against her employer, yet not enough 
of a “minister” to qualify for the parsonage exemption.  Even though this 
sex-based disparate impact likely does not rise to the level of unconstitution-
ality, it raises further policy questions about the parsonage exemption’s con-
tinued existence. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PARSONAGE EXEMPTION 
I.R.C. § 107, which has long been known as the “parsonage exemption,” 
includes two provisions.  It states that the gross income of a “minister of the 
gospel” does not include (1) the rental value of a home furnished as part of 
the minister’s compensation, or (2) a rental allowance paid as part of com-
pensation, to the extent used by the minister to rent or provide a home, as 
long as the allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the home, in-
cluding furnishings and utilities.8 On its face, the provision seems clear 
enough: there is a tax-free housing benefit that religious figures can receive, 
which likely facilitates their employment in some way.  However, further 
consideration of the seemingly simple rule reveals several complex issues, 
particularly in terms of who qualifies for the exemption and how this exemp-
tion’s structure differs from other tax-free housing provisions. 
A. Who Is a Minister? 
Despite the Christian connotations of the phrase “minister of the gospel” 
in I.R.C. § 107, courts have interpreted this statute to apply to non-Christian 
“ministers” as well.9 This is not surprising, given the clear Establishment 
 
 7 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Commission, 
565 U.S. 171, 190, 195 (2012) (recognizing a “ministerial exception to employment discrimination 
suits”).  
 8 See I.R.C. § 107 (excluding from gross income the rental value of parsonages). 
 9 See, e.g., Adam Chodorow, The Parsonage Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 861 (2018) (noting 
that the United States Tax Court has construed the parsonage exception to apply to leaders of 
diverse faiths).  
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Clause concerns that would result from providing this benefit only to Chris-
tian religions.  Thus, for instance, the Tax Court has held that a Jewish can-
tor who has credentials formally recognized by a national association and 
who regularly conducts a congregation’s liturgical services, officiates at wed-
dings and funerals, and provides religious instruction to the congregation’s 
youth qualifies as a “minister of the gospel” for purposes of the parsonage 
exemption.10   
The interpretation that the exemption is available to “ministers of the 
gospel” of all faiths does not explain how to determine whether someone 
counts as a minister in the first place, however.  In dicta, the Tax Court has 
defined a minister as someone “authorized to administer the sacraments, 
preach and conduct services of worship.”11 But because religions vary as to 
whether such activities can be conducted by lay individuals in addition to 
ordained people, and further vary as to the process for ordination, there is 
no bright-line rule for who qualifies as a minister for purposes of I.R.C. § 
107. The  Internal Revenue Service has stated routinely that it will not pro-
vide any advance ruling on whether someone is “minister of the gospel” for 
purposes of the parsonage exemption.12 Instead, the Treasury Regulations 
under I.R.C. § 107 specifically provide that the standards contained in Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5 will apply in determining whether the housing benefit op-
erates as a form of remuneration for services that are “ordinarily the duties 
of the minister of the gospel.”  These include services that constitute “the 
conduct of religious worship or the ministration of sacerdotal functions” as 
well as “directing, managing, or promoting the activities of such organiza-
tion.”13 Thus, the definition of who can be a “minister” is very broad. 
Interestingly, the statutory language of I.R.C. § 107 itself does not even 
require that the minister actually be engaged in ministerial functions in order 
to receive tax-free housing.  Imagine, for example, that an individual has 
been ordained as a minister in a particular faith.  That person then returns 
to school and becomes a medical doctor.  The religious organization or con-
gregation decides that it would be convenient to have this doctor routinely 
 
 10 See, e.g., Salkov v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 190, 194 (1966) (“Although ‘minister of the gospel’ is phrased 
in Christian terms, we are satisfied that Congress did not intend to exclude those persons who are 
the equivalent of “ministers” in other religions. Nomenclature alone is not determinative.”). Rec-
ognizing the Christian bias embedded in the word “minister,” we use it reluctantly, and for con-
venience purposes only. See, e.g., Minister, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2019) (“A person ap-
pointed to perform a liturgical duty or other service in the Christian church; a deacon, acolyte, 
etc.”). 
 11 Salkov, 46 T.C. at 194. 
 12 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2019-3; 2019-01 I.R.B. 130, §3.01(19). 
 13 Treas. Reg. § 1.1402-(c)-5 (listing rules applicable to the determination of whether minister is per-
forming services “in exercise of his ministry”). 
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attend congregational services and functions, in the event of any medical 
emergencies.  The religious organization has housing that it is willing to make 
available to the doctor at no cost, and the doctor moves in.  Based on a read-
ing of the statute alone, it is not clear that the doctor would be required to 
include the value of the housing in gross income.  Only by referring to the 
regulations under I.R.C. § 107 and the incorporation by reference of Treas. 
Reg. § 1.1402(c)-5 does one read into the statute a requirement that the min-
ister must be “in exercise of his ministry or in the exercise of duties required 
by such [religious] order” in order to receive the housing benefits tax-free.14 
These regulations are not binding law, however, and are subject to judicial 
review.15 
B. How the Parsonage Exemption Differs From Other Tax-Free Housing 
Statutes 
The parsonage exemption differs from I.R.C. § 119, the other major tax 
rule applicable to tax-free housing related to employment.  Generally speak-
ing, under I.R.C. § 119 an employee may exclude from gross income the 
value of any lodging furnished to the employee if the employee is required to 
accept the lodging on the employer’s business premises as a condition of em-
ployment.16 Salient aspects of I.R.C. § 119 are that the lodging must be on 
the business premises of the employer and that residing in that housing must be 
required in order for the employee to “properly perform the duties of his em-
ployment…for example, the lodging is furnished because the employee is re-
quired to be available for duty at all times, or because the employee could 
not perform the services required of him unless he is furnished such lodg-
ing.”17 One example is a funeral director who must reside in the same build-
ing as the funeral home, because the business receives phone calls at all hours 
and the funeral director must have easy access to the materials and equip-
ment necessary to transport bodies to the funeral home.18 Another example 
is a cattle ranch manager who must tend to the cattle at irregular hours and 
 
 14 Id. See also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.107-1(a) (“In general, the rules provided in § 1.1402(c)5 will be applicable 
to such determination” of whether the home or rental allowance has been “provided as remunera-
tion for services which are ordinarily the duties of the minister of the gospel”).  
 15 See, e.g., Walton v. Commissioner, 1115 T.C. 589, 594-602 (2000) (concluding that a regulation 
promulgated under I.R.C. § 2702 is not a valid interpretation of law, and thus that the estate plan-
ning device known as a “zeroed-out GRAT” is permissible). 
 16 I.R.C. § 119(a)(2). 
 17 Treas. Reg. § 1.119(b)(3) (1985) (elaborating on the necessary showing that the employee is “re-
quired to accept such lodging as a condition of his employment”). 
 18 See, e.g., Schwartz v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 835 (1963) (holding that a funeral director’s 
housing is governed by § 119 because “it was in its best business interests to have petitioners reside 
in the funeral home and required that they do so as a condition of their employment”).  
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whose presence is needed to safeguard the cattle from natural and other dan-
gers.19 Other minor exclusions under I.R.C. § 119 provide for a tax-free 
housing benefit for employees living in a “camp” in a foreign country because 
the employee is required to render services in a remote area where no hous-
ing is available.20 Exclusions are also available for employees of certain edu-
cational institutions or academic health centers who receive housing on or in 
the proximity of the campus.21  
The specific requirements of I.R.C. § 119—in particular, that the hous-
ing must be on the employer’s business premises and that the employee needs 
to live there in order to perform his or her duties—go to the policy that the 
purpose of the housing is to meet the “convenience” (or needs) of the em-
ployer, rather than to provide compensation to the employee.22  
In contrast to the tax-free lodging under I.R.C. § 119, the tax-free lodging 
under I.R.C. § 107 is much more akin to a compensation substitute. The 
minister need not reside in property owned by the religious congregation, the 
property need not be on or near the “business premises,” and—perhaps most 
significantly—the benefit does not have to be furnished in-kind.  The minis-
ter may receive a cash allowance instead of physical housing.  That means a 
minister who already owns his own home, for example, could use his tax-free 
housing allowance to pay down his mortgage or pay the rent of the very same 
apartment—wherever located—that he rented before taking the job as a 
minister.23 
C. The Purpose of the Parsonage Exemption 
The legislative history to I.R.C. § 107 is not especially robust.  In 1921, 
when the Internal Revenue Service first addressed the question of whether 
housing for ministers gave rise to taxable income, it answered in the affirm-
ative.24 Congress responded almost immediately with the forerunner of 
I.R.C. § 107, but at that time, the exemption was limited to in-kind housing.25 
There is nothing in the either the House Report, the Senate Report or the 
 
 19 See, e.g., Wilhelm v. US, 257 F. Supp. 16, 21 (D. Wyo. 1966) (holding that a ranch manager was 
required to accept lodging on ranch premises because of a need to move cattle frequently for feeding 
and safety, as well as to guard against theft or loss). 
 20 See I.R.C. § 119(c) (applying to employees living in a foreign country in a common area not available 
to publish and which accommodates ten or more employees). 
 21 See IRC § 119(d) (applying to lodging furnished by certain educational institutions to employees). 
 22 See I.R.C. § 119(a) (excluding meals and lodging furnished “for the convenience of the employer” if 
certain other tests are met). 
 23 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (1963) (gross income does not include a rental allowance “to the 
extent such allowance is used by [minister] to rent or otherwise provide a home”). 
 24 O.D. 862-1921-4 C.B. 85. 
 25 Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 213(b)(11), 42 Stat. 227, 239 (1921). 
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reports of the legislative hearings that explains why Congress enacted the 
parsonage exemption initially.26 When Congress expanded the provision in 
1954 to also make cash allowances tax-exempt,27 Representative Peter Mack 
of Illinois explained that the change was necessary in order to “correct … 
discrimination against certain ministers of the gospel who are carrying on 
such a courageous fight” against “a godless and antireligious world move-
ment.”28 Mack also believed that clergymen were underpaid, and so cash 
stipends could serve as a needed compensation boost.29 Other rationales for 
exempting both in-kind and cash housing benefits were to put on equal foot-
ing those denominations that did not traditionally build and offer housing to 
their ministers with those that did, as well as the need to neutralize economic 
differences between congregations (presumably on the theory that it would 
be easier for a less wealthy congregation to raise an annual stipend than to 
build new housing).30  
Over the years, several constitutional and tax law scholars have argued 
that the parsonage exemption violates the Establishment Clause.31 Recently, 
the FFRF set up a test case to explore this proposition.  The FFRF paid three 
of its officers a cash housing allowance, and those officers then filed tax re-
turns and sought refunds, alleging that their housing allowances should be 
tax-exempt.  When the refunds were not received, the officers brought a suit 
in the Western District of Wisconsin seeking to have I.R.C. § 107 declared 
unconstitutional, on the grounds that it violates the Establishment Clause.32 
After several procedural twists and turns, the district court ultimately ruled 
on summary judgment that § 107(2)—the portion of the parsonage exemp-
tion that deals with housing allowances as opposed to in-kind housing—is 
unconstitutional.   
 
 26 See generally, Income Tax: Internal Revenue Hearings on the Proposed Revenue Act of 1921 Before the S. Comm. 
on Fin., 67th Cong. 497-577 (1921); S. REP. NO. 67-257 (1921); H.R. REP. NO. 67-350 (1921). 
 27 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591-736, 68A Stat. 32, 32.  
 28 General Revenue Revision: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 83d Cong., 1576 (1953) (state-
ment of Rep. Peter Mack, Member, H. Comm. On Ways & Means). 
 29 H.R.  Rep. No. 83-1337, at 15 (1954) as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4035, 4040.  
 30 General Revenue Revision: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 83d Cong., supra note 28, at 
1574. 
 31 See, e.g., Chodorow, supra note 9, at 872-894 (analyzing Establishment Clause issues with the par-
sonage exemption); Erwin Chemerinksy, The Parsonage Exemption Violates the Establishment Clause and 
Should be Declared Unconstitutional, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 707 (2003) (limiting analysis to constitution-
ality of cash housing allowance); Richard H. Fallon, Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. 
REV. 57, 99 (2017) (proposing that parsonage exemption be subject to strict scrutiny and stating 
that it should be declared unconstitutional under such an analysis). 
 32 See generally, Complaint, Gaylor v. Lew, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (No. 16 Civ. 215), 
rev’d sub nom. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 2019 WL 1217647 (Mar. 15, 2019). See also U.S. CONST. Amend. 
I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof…”). 
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In so concluding, the district court held that the statute violates the Es-
tablishment Clause because it does not have a secular purpose or effect and 
because a reasonable observer would view it as an endorsement of religion.  
In particular, the court emphasized § 107(2)’s special features, such as its ex-
tension to housing allowances (as opposed to solely in-kind housing) and the 
absence of a need to show that the minister is required to accept such housing 
as a condition of employment and for the convenience of the employer.    
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT REJECTS ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
CHALLENGE TO TAX-FREE CLERGY HOUSING ALLOWANCE 
The district court’s rejection of the parsonage exemption garnered tre-
mendous attention.  Not surprisingly, the I.R.S. filed an appeal quickly; the 
Service was joined by the other religious organizations and ministers who 
had been permitted to intervene in the case.  Additionally, amicus briefs op-
posing the district court’s decision came from numerous religious organiza-
tions,33 members of Congress34 and the States of Wisconsin, Arizona, Arkan-
sas, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia, and the 
Attorney General of Michigan.35 Within legal academia, three tax professors 
filed an amicus brief against the district court’s decision and arguing in favor 
of the constitutionality of the parsonage exception,36 while twenty-three tax 
professors filed an amicus brief supporting the appellees-plaintiffs.37    
Approximately five months later—on March 15, 2019—a unanimous 
three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision, 
holding that the parsonage exemption did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.  Noting that the Supreme Court had still not settled on a single Es-
tablishment Clause standard, the Gaylor court evaluated the constitutionality 
of the parsonage exemption under two different Establishment Clause tests: 
 
 33 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Brief for Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability, et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Appellants, Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 18-1277 & 
18-1280), 2018 WL 2017944.  
 34 See, e.g., Kelly J. Shackelford et al., Brief for Members of Congress as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellants, Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420 (Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280), 2018 WL 2180988.  
 35 See Brad D. Schimel et al., Brief for the States of Wisconsin, et al., and the Attorney General of 
Michigan as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 
2019) (Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280), 2018 WL 2017943. 
 36 See Alexander James Egbert, Brief for Tax Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appel-
lants, Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280) 
 37 See Adam Chodorow,  Brief for Tax Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, 
Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2019) (Nos. 18-1277 & 18-1280). The signatories to this 
amicus brief included one of the authors of this essay.   
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the longstanding Lemon test (itself comprised of three prongs)38 and the much 
more recent Town of Greece historical significance test.39 Under either test, the 
Seventh Circuit wrote, the parsonage exemption passes constitutional mus-
ter.40  
The Gaylor court began its Lemon test analysis with a discussion of whether 
the legislation had a secular purpose, and concluded that it did.41 The par-
sonage exemption, the court reasoned, was simply one of many “parallel pro-
visions” in the tax law that exempt employer-provided housing.42 None of 
the other provisions cited, however, permits an employee to exclude an em-
ployer-provided cash allowance, as I.R.C.  § 107 does.43  Nor do any of the 
other housing provisions accord tax-free status to housing benefits unrelated 
to the employee’s work duties.44  But the Gaylor court did not view these dif-
ferences as dispositive.  Instead, the court accepted the government’s argu-
ment that the parsonage exemption’s inclusion of both in-kind housing and 
cash housing allowances helped eliminate “discrimination between minis-
ters,” since smaller or poorer denominations might not be able to afford in-
kind housing.   The court did not discuss the fact that at this point, any such 
disparity has shrunk, given that the overwhelming majority of religions only 
provide cash allowances.45  The court further accepted the government’s ar-
gument that the parsonage exemption’s approach is the best way to avoid 
entanglement with religion, insofar as the current approach provides a per se 
exemption rather than requiring religious organizations to defend their ap-
proach to their ministers’ housing.  
The Gaylor court next considered whether I.R.C. § 107 satisfies Lemon’s 
second prong: that the “principal or primary effect [of the law] must be one 
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”46 Citing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, which upheld a munic-
ipal tax exemption for church-owned property,47 the court reasoned that 
granting a tax exemption “is not sponsorship since the government does not 
transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding 
 
 38 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (articulating a three-part test for evaluating 
Establishment Clause claims). 
 39 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (“[T]he Establishment Clause must be 
interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 40 Gaylor, 919 F.3d at 435-436.  
 41 Id. at 435 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).  
 42 Id. at 429. 
43      See I.R.C. § 107 (stating no requirement that the tax-free housing be used in conjunction with the                                                                                   
…….taxpayer’s work as a minister). 
44       Id. 
 45 See Zylstra, supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 46 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted). 
 47 397 U.S. 664 (1970).  
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that the church support the state.”48 Even though the Seventh Circuit 
acknowledged that subsidies and exemptions may have the same economic 
impact, it stated that the failure to tax by definition represented non-ad-
vancement of religion, according to the precedent cited.  The court acknowl-
edged the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, in 
which the Court held that a sales tax exemption for religious publications 
was unconstitutional because it constituted a promotion of religion.49 But the 
Seventh Circuit relied on the fact that Texas Monthly was a plurality decision.  
“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining 
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,” the opinion stated, “the holding 
of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by the Members who con-
curred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”50 The court concluded 
that because the parsonage exemption provided an exemption rather than a 
tax subsidy, its primary effect was “not to advance religion on behalf of the 
government, but to ‘allow[] churches to advance religion.’” 
Finally, on the third prong of the Lemon test—that the law may “not foster 
an excessive entanglement with religion”51—the court stated that some gov-
ernment entanglement with religion is inevitable, but the broad tax benefit 
of I.R.C. § 107 avoids “excessive” entanglement by obviating the need to 
inquire into whether and how the minister uses the home for ministry-related 
functions.52 Indeed, this analysis echoed the court’s earlier analysis under 
Lemon’s first prong, where the court held that one of the secular purposes of 
the statute was to avoid excessive entanglement.   
The Seventh Circuit then turned from Lemon to the Supreme Court’s 
2014 decision in Town of Greece,53 in which the Court stated that the Estab-
lishment Clause must be interpreted “by reference to historical practices and 
understandings.”  There, the Supreme Court held that beginning a town 
board meeting with a prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause in large 
part because the Framers themselves had considered legislative prayer “be-
nign” and the “First Congress provided for the appointment of chaplains 
only days after approving language for the First Amendment.”  The Town of 
Greece Court thus implied that the practice could not possibly violate the First 
Amendment when it had been accepted by the very same people who drafted 
and ratified the First Amendment.  The Gaylor court extended this reasoning 
 
 48 Gaylor, 919 F.3d at 434 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 675) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 49 489 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
 50 Gaylor, 919 F.3d at 433, (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
 51 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted). 
 52 Gaylor, 919 F.3d at 434-435.  
 53 572 U.S. at 576 (stating that alleged Establishment Clause violations should be evaluated “by ref-
erence to historical practices and understandings”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).  
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to the parsonage exemption, stating that as early as 1802, Congress had per-
mitted the County of Alexandria, Virginia (then under federal control) to 
exempt church property from taxation, that in 1855 the Supreme Court had 
accepted religious property tax exemptions, and that today, over 2,600 exist-
ing federal laws provide some sort of exemptions related to religion.54  For 
these reasons, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the parsonage exemption 
passed the “historical significance” test as well as the Lemon test, and thus did 
not violate the Establishment Clause.    
In our view, the Gaylor court’s reasoning has several key flaws.  First, in 
its application of Lemon’s “primary effect” test, the court conclusorily relied 
on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Walz (upholding a property tax exemp-
tion for properties used for religious worship) and Amos (upholding Title VII’s 
provision allowing religious entities to discriminate on the basis of religion) 
for the proposition that exemptions do not amount to government support.  
The Gaylor court failed to grapple with the reality that a tax exemption has 
the same financial effect as a tax subsidy, as noted by Texas Monthly.  Indeed, 
the court declined to engage at all with Texas Monthly’s substantive reasoning, 
instead relying entirely on its status as a plurality opinion.  But the very fact 
that the Treasury Department and religious organizations claimed in their 
amicus briefs that “the survival of many congregations hangs in the balance” 
of the validity of the parsonage exemption55 is further proof that § 107 func-
tions as an active subsidy of religion.  The legislative history of the 1954 ex-
pansion of the parsonage exemption, in citing the need to bolster the salaries 
of ministers, supports this claim.56 Similarly, the Gaylor court did not consider 
the factual differences between the narrower exemptions in Walz and Amos 
and the broad nature of the parsonage exception.  Indeed, the Walz exemp-
tion of religious property is much more analogous to a parsonage exemption 
that would only cover in-kind housing, rather than a cash allowance.  Like-
wise, the Amos exemption had a Free Exercise Clause-related purpose—“lift-
ing a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion”—that is not present 
here.    
Second, the Gaylor court overstated the amount of entanglement that 
would result between government and religious entities if the parsonage ex-
emption were limited to only covering in-kind housing, i.e., if parsonages 
were simply covered under I.R.C. § 119.  This flaw permeates the opinion, 
undergirding the court’s analysis under the first and third prongs of Lemon, in 
which the court concluded that the parsonage exemption was less entangling 
than the other alternatives.  As Adam Chodorow has persuasively written, 
 
 54 Gaylor, 919 F.3d at 436. 
 55 Id. at 423. 
 56 See supra Part I.B. 
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however, applying I.R.C. § 119 to ministers likely would lead to less entan-
glement.57 Such an approach would eliminate from coverage the 87% of 
ministers who solely receive cash housing allowances, which itself would “sig-
nificantly reduc[e] church-state interactions.”58 As for the small percentage 
of ministers receiving in-kind housing, the tax authorities would simply have 
to confirm that the housing was on-site, required as a condition of employ-
ment and for the convenience of the employer.  These inquiries are not par-
ticularly doctrinal or intrusive in nature.   
Finally, the Gaylor court’s application of the “historical significance” test 
is particularly questionable.  In focusing on the broad history of religion-re-
lated tax exemptions, the Seventh Circuit elided the fact that the specific 
practice facing challenge—the extension of the parsonage exemption to cash 
allowances—occurred only in 1954.  This makes it much less analogous to the 
practice of legislative prayer, which dates back to the nation’s founding.  Nor 
did the Gaylor court consider whether the historical significance test should 
apply differently when the challenged governmental practice involves finan-
cial rather than symbolic support for religion.  
III. MINISTERIAL TAX BENEFITS AND SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Although the primary focus of most commentary on the parsonage ex-
emption is whether it violates the Establishment Clause, there is another issue 
lurking in the background: sex discrimination.  Numerous religions do not 
ordain women.  Indeed, a recent Pew Research Center report noted that 
“[m]any of the nation’s largest denominations, including Roman Catholics, 
Southern Baptists, Mormons (Latter-Day Saints), and the Orthodox Church 
in America, do not ordain women or allow them to lead congregations.”59   
Such religions do not risk employment discrimination liability for these 
sex-based classifications.  The Supreme Court has broadly held that the 
“ministerial exception,” stemming from both the Establishment and Free Ex-
ercise Clauses, shields religious organizations from all employment discrimi-
nation lawsuits.60 “When a minister who has been fired sues her church al-
leging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has 
struck the balance for us,” the Supreme Court wrote in Hosanna-Tabor Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.61 
 
 57 Chodorow, supra note 9, at 855. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Masci, supra note 6.   
 60 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.  
 61 Id. 
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“The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”62 
The parsonage exemption, in turn, can amplify the effect of such sex discrim-
ination.  Not only do some women lack the opportunity to serve as ministers 
in the first place, but they are also deprived of the corresponding tax benefit 
that such ministers might receive.  This tax treatment is not a foregone con-
clusion; some of the religions that do not ordain women still classify certain 
female employees as “ministers of the gospel” for purposes of the parsonage 
exemption.  For example, the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod does not 
ordain women as pastors,63 but still deems some women holding church po-
sitions (such as deaconesses) eligible for the parsonage exemption.64 How-
ever, it is entirely up to each religious organization to make this choice, just 
as each organization has complete discretion to determine who can serve as 
a minister at all.  
Recently, Amanda Retberg, a former professor at Wisconsin Lutheran 
College, which follows the rules of the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran 
Synod, discovered that male professors were being classified  as “ministers,” 
and thus were able to exclude housing allowances from their taxable income, 
while women holding the same professorial positions were not receiving that 
classification.65 Indeed, the Synod’s current tax manual specifically states that 
“[a]ll called pastors, male staff ministers, male professors and male teachers 
of the WELS are considered ‘Ministers of the Gospel’ according to a private 
letter ruling from the IRS dated March 2, 1955.”66 Retberg was so disturbed 
by this disparity that she left her job (as well as the Synod).67 In response to a 
reporter’s inquiry, the Provost of Western Lutheran College acknowledged 
the inequality and stated that in order to equalize the treatment of male and 
female employees, “WLC has chosen to provide a stipend to female called 
workers toward the goal of compensation equity among all WLC called 
workers.”68  
 
 62 Id. 
 63 See The Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, The Ordination of Women to the Pastoral Office, 
lcms.org/Document.fdoc?src=lcm&id=1099&dialogFeatures=protocol=http.  
 64 Id.  
 65 See Amanda Retberg, Discrepancy or Discrimination? Doesn’t Matter, YOUR TAX MATTERS PARTNER 
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://ytmp.blogspot.com/2019/03/discrepancy-or-discrimination-
doesnt.html. 
 66 Peter J. Reilly, Parsonage: Religious Liberty Smuggles Sex Discrimination Into Tax Law, FORBES (Mar. 20, 
2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2019/03/20/parsonage-religious-liberty-smug-
gles-sex-discrimination-into-tax-law/#7401466566bd).  
 67 See Retburg, supra note 65 (“I found all of this deeply troubling and personally, could no longer 
support this inequality. Therefore, awhile back I made the decision to leave the college and denom-
ination.”). 
 68 Id.  
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The economic equalization impulse is laudable, but this approach does 
not fully rectify the disparity.  If Western Lutheran College and similarly sit-
uated religious employers do provide female employees with a “gross up” on 
account of their (supposed) ineligibility for the parsonage exemption, then 
that effectively means that the college will have to pay women more in salary 
than they pay to men.  This may create a perverse incentive not to hire 
women at all.  It is also not clear that the stipend will fully equalize all situa-
tions, given potential variations in overall income and tax rates. 
Particularly ironic is the potential for a female employee to fall into the 
worst of both worlds: covered by the ministerial exception (and thus unable 
to bring any employment discrimination claims against her employer), but 
not considered a “minister of the gospel” for purposes of the parsonage ex-
emption.  Indeed, it is quite possible that Amanda Retberg would have found 
herself in this situation had she brought a lawsuit to challenge her employer’s 
practice of providing only male professors with a housing allowance—or, for 
that matter, if she brought an entirely unrelated employment discrimination 
lawsuit against her employer, such as a claim under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act.69 Under Hosanna-Tabor, there is no “rigid formula for deciding 
when an employee qualifies as a minister.”70 Relevant factors include the 
employee’s formal title, the substance reflected in that title, the employee’s 
own use of that title, and the extent to which the employee performs religious 
functions.71 Courts have recently held that a “lay principal” at a Catholic 
elementary school,72 a Hebrew language teacher at a Jewish day school,73 
and a director of music at a Catholic parish74 all fell within the ministerial 
exception, even though there was no discussion of whether they also were 
receiving, or would be eligible to receive, tax-free housing under I.R.C. § 
107.  Additionally, the United States District Court for the District of South 
Carolina recently held that an English as a Second Language professor at a 
multi-denominational Christian university was covered by the ministerial ex-
ception, and thus could not bring an employment discrimination claim 
against her employer, even though she had never benefited from the parson-
age exemption.75 A court might well have reached the same conclusion about 
 
 69 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192 (holding that, because the plaintiff employee (a religious school 
teacher) was covered by the ministerial exception, her Americans with Disabilities Act claim against 
her employer could not go forward). 
 70 Id. at 190.  
 71 Id. at 192. 
 72 Fratello v. Archdiocese of New York, 863 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 73 Grusgott v. Milwaukee Jewish Day School, Inc. 882 F.3d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 74 Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 319 F. Supp. 3d 940, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
 75 Lishu Yin v. Columbia International University, 335 F. Supp. 3d 803, 817 (D.S.C. 2018). 
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Retberg, who had been required to complete theology classes and require-
ments in order to obtain her position, and who was working at an explicitly 
religious university. 
To be clear, we are not arguing that the parsonage exemption is itself 
unconstitutional under an equal protection theory. Although the parsonage 
exemption does have a disparate impact on women, it is facially neutral.  
Thus, a court would apply heightened review to the parsonage exemption 
only upon a showing that it was intended to disadvantage women. There is no 
such showing to be made here.  In the case of the original parsonage exemp-
tion enacted in 1921, there is little to no legislative history.76  When Congress 
expanded the exemption in 1954 to permit a cash allowance, legislators re-
ferred to enhancing ministers’ salaries and eliminating distinctions between 
religious sects and congregations.77 If one were able to survey the lawmakers 
from 1954, it is likely that the “ministers” they had in mind were all men.  
Even so, that does not rise to the level of discriminatory intent.  Awareness 
that a particular law will benefit men more than women is not enough.  As 
the Supreme Court said in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, a challenger would 
need to show that Congress “selected or reaffirmed [this] particular course 
of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects 
upon” women.78 There is nothing in the record to support such a claim. 
For these reasons, it is unlikely that the parsonage exemption could be 
struck down as a form of sex discrimination.  Nevertheless, the exemption’s 
disparate impact as to sex does raise further questions—beyond those already 
discussed in the Establishment Clause context—about its continued wisdom.  
At the very least, for as long as the parsonage exemption remains in effect, 
public pressure might be brought to bear on religious organizations to treat 
men and women equally for tax purposes, even if they do not accord the title 
of “minister” to women.  After all, the deference afforded to religious institu-
tions to make these sorts of decisions would give them latitude to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
Because tax laws have measurable financial impacts, they are useful 
lenses for evaluating the constitutionality of the government’s decision to 
treat certain individuals or activities alike or differently.  The parsonage ex-
emption is problematic both because it favors religious employers over secu-
lar employers, and because it has a discriminatory impact on women.  Alt-
hough the stronger constitutional argument against the parsonage exemption 
 
 76 See supra Part I.C.  
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stems from the Establishment Clause, the exemption’s sex-discriminatory im-
pact is nevertheless an important policy issue that deserves attention. 
 
